Teori Permainan dalam Perancangan Kebijakan Publik: Interaksi Strategis, Kredibilitas, dan Reformasi Institusional di Demokrasi Berkembang
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.69836/ncrcs-sinesia.v2i1.182Keywords:
game theory, public policy reform, strategic interaction, institutional credibility, mechanism designAbstract
Reformasi kebijakan publik di negara demokrasi berkembang sering dipahami sebagai proses teknis dan administratif. Namun, dalam praktiknya banyak reformasi mengalami stagnasi, kepatuhan simbolik, dan kegagalan implementasi meskipun perubahan regulasi telah dilakukan secara luas. Penelitian ini berangkat dari permasalahan bahwa reformasi kebijakan sering mengabaikan interaksi strategis antar aktor institusional yang menentukan hasil reformasi. Dengan menggunakan kerangka teori permainan terintegrasi, artikel ini menganalisis reformasi sebagai hasil keseimbangan (equilibrium) yang dibentuk oleh struktur insentif, kredibilitas institusional, mekanisme penegakan, dan ekspektasi aktor. Penelitian menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif-konseptual melalui model permainan statis, permainan berulang, teori signaling, permainan koordinasi, dan mekanisme desain. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa kegagalan reformasi dapat muncul sebagai Nash equilibrium yang stabil ketika resistensi birokrasi memberikan payoff jangka pendek lebih tinggi dibandingkan kepatuhan. Analisis permainan berulang menunjukkan bahwa kerja sama dapat dipertahankan apabila aktor memiliki orientasi jangka panjang yang diperkuat melalui monitoring, audit, reputasi, dan sanksi yang kredibel. Dalam kondisi informasi asimetris, reformasi yang bersifat retoris cenderung menghasilkan pooling equilibrium yang melemahkan kepercayaan institusional, sedangkan reformasi yang memiliki biaya nyata mampu menghasilkan separating equilibrium yang meningkatkan kredibilitas. Penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa reformasi kebijakan publik harus dipahami sebagai rekayasa institusional strategis untuk menciptakan keseimbangan kooperatif yang stabil, bukan sekadar perubahan regulasi formal.
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